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Objective
Provide a method to link the magnitude of 
Common Cause Failure (CCF) risk to system 
qualities and to communicate the qualities that 
affect CCF for industries that do not have CCF 
data
– Explain a basic CCF calculation
– Detail the method
– Apply this method to two example systems
– Detail impacts to the example system and provide 
general guidance for all systems
Definition of common cause
• A CCF event is defined as the failure (or unavailable 
state) of more than one component due to a shared 
cause during the system mission. Viewed in this 
fashion, CCFs are inseparable from the class of 
dependent failures and the distinction is mainly based 
on the level of treatment and choice of modeling 
approach in reliability analysis.
The Beta Method
• 𝜆𝑇 = 𝜆𝑐𝑐+ 𝜆𝐼
• 𝛽 =
𝜆𝑐𝑐
𝜆𝑇
• 𝜆𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝜆𝑇
• 𝜆𝐼 = (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝑇
Purpose of method
• This method serves two purposes: 
– 1) allows an analyst to better model CCF with 
factors specific to a system that does not have CCF 
data, and; 
– 2) better communicate CCF coupling mechanisms to 
system designers, operators and maintainers. 
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Primary Factors that contribute to CCF
1. Separation/segregation
2. Diversity/ redundancy
3. Complexity/maturity of design/experience
4. Use of assessments/ analysis and feedback data
5. Procedures/ human interface (e.g. 
maintenance/testing)
6. Competence/ training/ safety culture
7. Environmental control (e.g., temperature, 
humidity, personnel access)
8. Environmental testing
Methodolgy
• 𝐶𝐶𝑆 = 1 ∙ N𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 5 ∙ N𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 + 10 ∙ Nℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
• 𝐶𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
𝐶𝐶𝑆
𝑇
×𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑉
Area Low Medium High
Separation/segregation x
Diversity/ Redundancy x
Complexity/maturity/experience x
Analysis and feedback data x
Procedures/human interface x
Competence/training/culture x
Environmental control x
Environmental testing x
sum of x's 8 0 0
Scoring 1 5 10
x * scoring 8 0 0
CCS
Total of x * scoring 8
𝐶𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
8
80
× .30 = 3%,
MCCV= maximum common cause value
CCS= common cause score
Example #1: Strong Safety Culture
• Government Oversight
• Heavy effect from public opinion
• Low probability with high catastrophic risk
• Heavy maintenance requirement
• Complex system
• Assume MCCV =20%
Example #1 results
Area Low Medium High
Separation/segregation x
Diversity/ Redundancy x
Complexity/maturity/experience x
Analysis and feedback data x
Procedures/human interface x
Competence/training/culture x
Environmental control x
Environmental testing x
sum of x's 5 3 0
Scoring 1 5 10
sum of x * scoring 5 15 0
CCS
Total of x * scoring 20
𝐶𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
20
80
× .20 = 5%,
Example #2: Poor Safety Culture
• Limited government oversight
• Poor safety record
• Operations very hazardous
• Working environmental conditions are harsh
• Assume MCCV =30%
Example #2 results
Area Low Medium High
Separation/segregation x
Diversity/ Redundancy x
Complexity/maturity/experience x
Analysis and feedback data x
Procedures/human interface x
Competence/training/culture x
Environmental control x
Environmental testing x
sum of x's 0 4 4
Scoring 1 5 10
x * scoring 0 20 40
CCS
Total of x * scoring 60
𝐶𝐶𝐹 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =
60
80
× .30 = 23%,
Summary and Conclusions
• Systems require ever higher levels of reliability and in many 
cases this is achieved by increased redundancy. 
– Without care, increasing redundancy may lead to increased CCFs 
thereby reducing reliability benefit . 
– Using generic data may grossly understate CCF risk and also 
significantly overstate system reliability.
• We reviewed the b factor CCF model and showed how it 
affects overall system reliability.
• Again, this method serves two purposes: 
– 1) allows an analyst to better model CCF with factors specific to a 
system that does not have CCF data, and; 
– 2) better communicate CCF coupling mechanisms to system 
designers, operators and maintainers. 
• Educating industries about CCF coupling mechanisms will 
result in more robust and reliable system operations and 
designs.
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